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Abstract
The paper examines whether plants in a multinational manufacturing firm with different roles have different degrees of
autonomy concerning planning, production and control decisions. Building on Ferdows’ framework for classifying international plants in a network, we empirically examine the proposition that the degree of managerial autonomy varies according
to strategic role of the plant. We ask whether different plant roles require different management systems and different levels
of responsibility for decisions and find evidence of differentiated fit.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Operations strategy; Global operations

1. Introduction
A company can manage a group of plants as a multinational network to learn more about technology, customers, products or processes than it would learn in
one location (MacCormack et al., 1994). It may also
gain advantages in cost or flexibility from managing a
group of plants as a network that it would not achieve
if these plants were managed as stand alone entities
(Scherer et al., 1975). One advantage of optimizing a
system of plants is that individual plants can specialize
in activities. To derive the benefits of specialization,
plants must be managed to integrate material flows,
management skills, product/process developments, or
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-716-645-3245;
fax: +1-716-645-6117.
E-mail address: cmaritan@buffalo.edu (C.A. Maritan).

other knowledge among plants. Plants develop roles
and have distinct management systems in place to then
transfer the benefits of the specialization back to the
other plants in the network. Accordingly, there should
be a fit between the way a plant is managed and what
is necessary to provide the integration for its particular specialized plant role. An important management
characteristic that may differ among plants in such a
network is the degree of autonomy the plant management has concerning different types of decisions about
the planning, production, and control of the plant. This
paper uses a survey of international plant managers to
investigate whether there is a fit between the degree
of autonomy over these key decisions and the role of
a plant in a network.
There are many conceptual articles that address the
challenges of coordinating a multiplant network in an
international context (Ferdows, 1989, 1997; Flaherty,
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1986; Oliff et al., 1989). Some of these frameworks
are derived for the entire network in terms of material flows (Flaherty, 1986), or for a plant type which
characterizes the network (Schmenner, 1982). Another
approach describes the role of the plants relative to
a network and allows for different plant roles within
the same network (Ferdows, 1989, 1997). We build
on this approach as developed by Ferdows because
of its implications for managing different plant roles
within a network. While Ferdows focuses on what the
appropriate role for a plant would be in different circumstances, and others focus on how plant roles may
change over time (e.g., Khurana and Talbot, 1998), we
focus on how to manage a plant given a particular role.
We are particularly interested in the degree of autonomy a plant has over key decisions because this is
a critical dimension representing differences in management authority. Centralization is a key dimension
of organization structure that concerns the locus of authority to make decisions (Pugh et al., 1968). A plant
operating in a business unit with a high degree of centralization would have a low degree of autonomy, with
most of the important decisions being made at a higher
level in the organization such as business unit headquarters or the corporate office. Conversely, a plant
with a high degree of autonomy would control many
of its important decisions. We expect that plants with
different roles should have different degrees of autonomy. If managers use similar systems throughout the
business unit to manage plants with different strategic
roles, the systems may be compromised for all plants,
or some plants may be managed inappropriately. On
the other hand, if managers know which management
systems need to be linked to specific plant roles, they
can differentiate the management systems within their
network to match the roles of plants. We use the empirical findings of our study to identify the specific
differences in management systems that occur when
different plant types operate within the same network.
The following section positions the Ferdows framework relative to other research on multinational firms
which emphasizes fit, and puts our empirical study on
the management implications of multinational plant
networks in that context. This is followed by a description of the research design and development of
our hypotheses. We then report the empirical tests and
our findings. We conclude with a discussion of key
results and the implication of our findings.

2. Theoretical background
In relationships between corporate headquarters
and country subsidiaries in multinational firms (e.g.,
Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989;
Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994), and between corporate
headquarters and the strategic business units in diversified firms (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986, 1991),
it is important to consider the “fit” between the context of the subsidiary or the business unit and the
systems used to manage them. Different strategic
roles of subsidiaries or business units may require
different management systems. A similar logic can
be applied to the relationship between a business unit
headquarters and individual plants in a multiplant
network. We draw on this logic to investigate the fit
between the context of the plant, which we define as
the plant role, and the way in which the plant should
be managed (Venkatraman, 1989; Dean and Snell,
1991). While there are conceptual articles arguing
for the importance of considering a plant level manufacturing strategy (e.g., Skinner, 1974), empirical
work has generally not conditioned the manufacturing strategy of the plant by its position in a network
of plants. Empirical studies of taxonomies of manufacturing strategies are primarily interested in the fit
of business unit competitive strategy with plant characteristics (Kotha and Vadlamani, 1995; Miller and
Roth, 1994; Roth and Miller, 1992; Swamidass and
Newell, 1987). In contrast, we are concerned with the
fit of a plant level manufacturing role with the differentiation of management systems’ relative autonomy
among plants within a business unit.
We build our analysis on the plant roles defined by
Ferdows (1989, 1997) (refer to Fig. 1). He developed
a framework that defines six plant roles based on two
dimensions: (1) the primary reason for establishing the
factory and (2) the extent of technical activities at the
site. Primary reason for the site is divided into three
categories: (1) access to low cost production input factors, (2) use of local technological resources and (3)
proximity to market. Extent of technical activities is
classified as being either low or high. Plants having a
low level of technical activities at the site are labeled
Off-Shore, Outpost, or Server depending on whether
they are located for access to inputs, local technology
or markets, respectively. Plants having a high level of
technical activities are labeled Source, Lead, or Con-
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Fig. 1. Generic roles of international factories (Ferdows, 1989).

tributor when located for inputs, local technology, or
markets, respectively. Because our analysis is based
on this framework, we describe Ferdows’ plant types
here in some detail.
2.1. Plants located close to low cost production
inputs
An Off-Shore plant is located to take advantage of
low cost production inputs. The products or components that are manufactured are typically shipped to
other facilities in the business unit. Only the minimum technical and managerial expertise required for
production is maintained. In these plants there is no
real engineering work, procurement decisions are very
short-term oriented, accounting and finance are strictly
for reporting to the home country management, and
the pattern of shipments are simple and not in the control of the Off-Shore plant management.
A Source plant is also located to take advantage of
low cost production inputs. But, unlike an Off-Shore
plant, there is both technical and managerial expertise
at the site because Source plants tend to specialize
in producing particular components or products, or
in using particular production processes on behalf of
other facilities in the business unit.
2.2. Plants located for proximity to market
A Server plant is located to manufacture a product
for a local market. Although there is a relatively low

level of technical and managerial expertise at the site,
there is some managerial autonomy over material and
information flow so that the plant can be responsive
to local market needs.
A Contributor plant is also located to serve a local
market. But, unlike a Server, it has a higher degree of
managerial and technical expertise at the site to develop and transfer know-how to other facilities in the
business unit. Like Source plants, Contributors specialize not only for themselves, but also on behalf of
the other facilities.
2.3. Plants located for use of local technological
resources
An Outpost plant is located for access to local technology and is established to collect information from
customers, suppliers, and competitors on behalf of the
business unit. The Outpost plant does not have the
managerial depth to act on this information but will
pass it on to other plants to do so.
Finally, a Lead plant is also located for access to
local technology. But, in addition to collecting technological information for its business unit, it uses
the information to innovate and develop manufacturing capabilities. The products and processes it develops may be transferred to other facilities in the
business unit. To support this role, a high level of
managerial and technical expertise is required at the
site.
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Through these descriptions, Ferdows (1989) defines
generic plant types and outlines broad strategic roles
for these different types. Within the broad confines of
these roles we focus on autonomy over key decisions
and develop hypotheses for how autonomy over decisions will differ by plant type.
3. Research design
3.1. Classification of plants
The data used in this analysis are from the Global
Manufacturing Network Survey conducted at the
Graduate School of Business Administration at the
University of Michigan. The purpose of this survey
was to assemble a comprehensive database containing
a variety of data regarding the configuration and operation of multinational manufacturing plant networks.
The survey was administered to plant managers in 31
countries whose corporate headquarters are located
primarily in the US, Western Europe, and Japan. All
participating firms had sent managers to the Global
Leadership Executive Management Program at the
University of Michigan, demonstrating an interest in
and concern for education on management of international manufacturing enterprises. These managers
took surveys back to their companies and distributed
them to plant managers. The response rate was exceptionally high (above 90%) for this reason.
From 209 survey responses, we identified 196 plants
that are distributed into all six of the strategic role
categories of Ferdows (1989): (i) Source (19), (ii)
Off-Shore (35), (iii) Lead (37), (iv) Outpost (22), (v)
Contributor (40) and (vi) Server (43). The remaining
13 observations were eliminated due to missing responses. Appendix A contains a profile of the sample

plants. The plants are owned by 47 companies, are located in 30 countries and represent 41 industries (as
defined by 3-digit SIC codes). Plants were classified
into the six categories in terms of the primary strategic
reason for the site and technical activities at the site
(Ferdows, 1989). The survey items used to classify the
plants by their roles are found in Table 1. To facilitate
analysis, each plant in the sample is assigned a single role. Although Ferdows acknowledges that some
factories may combine two or more roles, he argues
that “this simple framework is helpful in articulating
the strategic contributions of most foreign factories”
(1997, 77).
To determine the primary strategic reason for establishing the plant we used responses to the following
question: “To what degree did the following factors
influence your plant’s location decision?” A set of
location determinants was provided and respondents
rated each on a 6-point scale where 0 is “not at all”
and 5 is “very large extent”. We grouped the location
determinants that the respondents rated into the three
strategic reasons for the site used by Ferdows. We
considered access to raw materials, access to low-cost
labor, access to energy and access to key suppliers
to comprise the strategic reason, access to low cost
production input factors. Access to local technology,
access to skilled labor and access to advanced infrastructure comprise the second strategic reason, use of
local technological resources. Finally, proximity to
important markets and proximity to market comprise
the third strategic reason, proximity to market. To determine the primary strategic reason for locating each
plant we selected the location determinant that rated
the highest score. Ties were settled by comparing the
average score for the items in each group.
To determine the technical activities at the site we
used responses to the question: “Who has the primary

Table 1
Items used to identify plant roles
Extent of technical
activities at the site

Primary strategic reason for the site
Access to low cost production
input factors

Use of local technological
resources

Proximity to market

Responsibility for
Original product design
Original process design
Changes in product design
Changes in process Design

Access to
Low cost labor
Raw materials
Energy
Key suppliers

Access to
Local technology
Skilled labor
Advanced infrastructure

Proximity to
Important markets
Key customers

C.A. Maritan et al. / Journal of Operations Management 22 (2004) 489–503

responsibility for the following tasks for your plant?”
The following tasks were considered: original product design, product design changes, original process
design and process design changes. All of these tasks
require technological competence to perform and we
assume that autonomy over these tasks means that the
plant possesses the requisite competence to effectively
complete them. Respondents rated the items using a
5-point scale where 1 is “worldwide headquarters”, 2
is “regional headquarters”, 3 is “another plant”, 4 is
“your plant in coordination with another plant” and
5 is “your plant”. Only responses of “your plant in
coordination with another plant” or “your plant” indicate that these technical activities take place at the site
so if a respondent answered either 4 or 5, the plant
was assigned a score of 1 for that item, otherwise it
was assigned as 0. The scores for the four items were
summed and each plant had an overall score of 0–4 for
its technological competence rating. An overall rating
of 0 or 1 means that the plant performs no more than
one of product design, product design changes, process design or process design changes. We considered
this to constitute a relatively low level of technical ac-
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tivities at the site. We considered a rating of 2–4 to
represent a relatively high level of technical activities
at the site.
To assess the reasonableness of this cut-off we examined the average technological competence rating
for the plants in each role. Although Ferdows defines
only two categories in the framework, high and low,
his descriptions of the plants indicate that there is
more variation. Our Lead plants have the highest rating (3.32) followed by Contributor (2.88) and Source
(2.32) plants. The relative ratings correspond to the
descriptions giving us some confidence in our classification method.
3.2. Factor analysis
The explanatory variables in the model are measures
of the degree of autonomy that the plant has over different categories of management decisions. We sought
to understand whether particular decisions are controlled by the plant or by other parts of the network.
For each type of decision listed in Table 2 respondents
were asked “Who has the primary responsibility for the

Table 2
Decision autonomy means for plant roles (1–5 scale)
Factors

Management decisions

All plants
(n = 196)

Source
(n = 19)

Lead
(n = 37)

Contributor
(n = 40)

Off-Shore
(n = 35)

Outpost
(n = 22)

Server
(n = 43)

Planning
decisions

Long range production
planning
Production scheduling
Quality standards
Maintenance policies and
practices

3.30

3.79

3.49

3.33

2.94

2.68

3.49

4.52
3.02
4.58

4.84
3.42
4.53

4.68
3.68
4.59

4.63
3.53
4.88

4.49
2.77
4.34

3.77
1.91
4.77

4.56
2.56
4.42

Raw material sourcing

3.46

4.11

3.76

4.05

3.54

2.59

2.77

Component sourcing
Equipment sourcing

3.83
4.14

4.26
4.68

3.89
4.38

4.30
4.58

4.09
3.97

2.82
3.41

3.47
3.79

Human resource policies
for management
Human resource policies
for labor
Choice of accounting
system
Choice of management
information system
Choice of production
planning and control
system

2.44

2.68

2.43

2.68

1.94

2.77

2.37

3.50

3.84

3.43

4.13

2.94

3.36

3.35

2.20

2.95

2.22

2.58

1.83

1.73

2.05

2.69

2.63

2.81

3.18

2.46

2.50

2.44

3.31

3.37

3.54

3.80

2.74

3.23

3.14

All decisions

3.41

3.76

3.57

3.80

3.17

2.96

3.20

Production
decisions

Control
decisions
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following tasks for your plant?” using a 5-point scale
in which “your plant” is 5, “your plant in coordination with another plant” is 4, “another plant” is 3, “regional headquarters” is 2, “worldwide headquarters”
is 1.
The 12 decision types were factor analyzed to determine if it is appropriate to group them into categories. We used the principal components method with

varimax rotation. The number of factors was determined using a scree plot. The resulting set of three
management system factors and the items that loaded
on each are listed in Table 2. The first factor captures
Planning decisions and includes long range production
planning, production scheduling, quality standards and
maintenance policies and practices. The second factor
captures Production decisions and includes raw ma-

Fig. 2. Schematic diagram for hypotheses. Arrows represent pairwise contrasts.

C.A. Maritan et al. / Journal of Operations Management 22 (2004) 489–503
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terial sourcing, component sourcing, and equipment
sourcing. The third factor captures Control decisions
and includes HR policies for management, HR policies for labor, choice of cost accounting system, choice
of management information system and choice of production planning and control system.

ability to make changes in processes or products at
the plant. Thus autonomy for these decisions should
be greatest in plants that have a higher level of technological competence at the plant site. Therefore, we
expect Source, Contributor and Lead plants to enjoy
more autonomy on these dimensions than Off-Shore,
Server and Outpost plants respectively.

4. Hypotheses

H1a. Source plants will differ from Off-Shore plants
in their greater autonomy over planning decisions
(such as long range production planning, production
schedules, quality standards and maintenance policies
and practices).

Do the fits that we observe between the plant roles
and autonomy over key management decisions match
those suggested by Ferdows? The following sections
investigate this question. We develop hypotheses for
pairwise contrasts in plant roles concerning different
levels of autonomy for key management decisions. We
do not develop hypotheses for all possible pairwise
contrasts and all three decision types, planning, production and control. Instead, we focus on contrasts
that appear to be most plausible and that are generally consistent with the Ferdows’ descriptions. Because these issues of plant roles in multinational firms
have not been explored empirically in a large sample
context it is worthwhile to develop hypotheses for as
many contrasts as we can, while still having a rationale consistent with the general differences between
plant roles. In this way, we are both seeking to confirm some of the basic dimensions in the framework,
as well as to surface some possible inconsistencies
in the way autonomy for decisions may be understood relative to the framework. Fig. 2 summarizes the
hypotheses.
4.1. Autonomy over planning decisions
A key element of Ferdow’s framework is differences in technological competence. Plants within a
single column of the framework are located for a similar reason but differ in terms of the technical activities at the site. Based on Ferdows’ descriptions, plants
with fewer technical activities at the site also have less
management depth. In Off-Shore, Outpost and Server
plants managerial investment is kept solely at the level
needed for day-to-day management of the plant. So,
we consider the degree of investment in management
at the plant and ask if plants with more management
depth have greater autonomy over planning decisions.
Modifying key planning decisions might require the

H1b. Contributor plants will differ from Server plants
in their greater autonomy over planning decisions
(such as long range production planning, production schedules, quality standards, and maintenance
policies and practices).
H1c. Lead plants will differ from Outpost plants in
their greater autonomy over planning decisions (such
as long range production planning, production schedules, quality standards, and maintenance policies and
practices).
Even within the plants that have a high extent of
technical activities at the site there are differences in
technological competence. Lead plants are located for
access to technology. These factories may be the sole
producer of key products or components for the business unit or may initiate new technologies that are not
dependent on interactions with suppliers or customers.
The Lead plant will have the most managerial autonomy on technical decisions that relate to the ability to
develop and produce new products and processes. We
expect Lead plants to have even greater control and
autonomy with regard to planning decisions involving
technical activities.
H2a. Lead plants will differ from Source plants in
their greater autonomy on planning decisions (such
as long range production planning, production schedules, quality standards, and maintenance policies and
practices).
H2b. Lead plants will differ from Contributor plants
in their greater autonomy on planning decisions (such
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as long range production planning, production schedules, quality standards, and maintenance policies and
practices).

H3d. Lead plants will differ from Contributor plants
in their greater autonomy over production decisions
(such as raw material sourcing, component sourcing,
and equipment sourcing).

4.2. Autonomy over production decisions
4.3. Autonomy over control decisions
Given a common level of technical activity at the
plant site, what are the differences in autonomy over
production decisions among plants that are located for
access to markets versus those that are located for access to low cost inputs? The primary contrast between
Off-Shore and Server plants and between Source and
Contributor plants involves the management of material flows and selection of equipment and production processes that might be locally or regionally determined. Since the plants located for access to inputs must produce products that are fed into a system
of inputs used by other plants, we would expect that
they have less autonomy than plants that are serving
markets. For the plants whose mission is related to
markets, their processes need to be primarily suitable
to their customers. To allow for this flexibility they
should have more autonomy over key production decisions.
H3a. Server plants will differ from Off-Shore plants
in their greater autonomy over production decisions
(such as raw material sourcing, component sourcing
and equipment sourcing).
H3b. Contributor plants will differ from Source plants
in their greater autonomy over production decisions
(such as raw material sourcing, component sourcing
and equipment sourcing).
Lead plants have a higher level of technological
competence at the site than Contributor and Source
plants. Thus when it comes to production decisions,
one might also expect Lead plants to have greater autonomy on key decisions related to production regarding important production sourcing decisions such as
raw material sourcing, component sourcing and equipment sourcing than either Source or Contributor plants.

Since there is greater management depth in the
plants with more technological competence we also
expect that they will have greater autonomy over
control decisions that are concerned with management objectives across the network. Headquarters
will in general retain authority over many control decisions and practices but we expect that plants with
technical activities at the site will still have greater
autonomy over these decisions than plants that do
not.
H4a. Source plants will differ from Off-Shore plants
in their greater autonomy over control decisions (such
as human resource policies for management, human
resource policies for labor, choice of cost accounting
system, choice of management information system,
and choice of production planning and control system).
H4b. Contributor plants will differ from Server plants
in their greater autonomy over control decisions (such
as human resource policies for management, human
resource policies for labor, choice of cost accounting
system, choice of management information system,
and choice of production planning and control system).
H4c. Lead plants will differ from Outpost plants in
their greater autonomy over control decisions (such
as human resource policies for management, human
resource policies for labor, choice of cost accounting
system, choice of management information system,
and choice of production planning and control system).

5. Empirical test
H3c. Lead plants will differ from Source plants in
their greater autonomy over production decisions
(such as raw material sourcing, component sourcing,
and equipment sourcing).

We tested the hypotheses using a multinomial logit
model as a discriminant technique (Press and Wilson, 1978). The dependent variable in the analysis

0.17 (0.27)
1.07 (0.62)
−0.97† (−1.51)
−3.58∗ (−2.10)
−0.55 (−1.09)
3.65∗∗ (2.91)
0.17 (0.27)
1.07 (0.62)
n = 196; χ2 (20) = 55.57, P > χ2 = 0.00.
∗ P < .05 (one-tailed test).
∗∗ P < 0.01 (one-tailed test).
∗∗∗ P < 0.001 (one-tailed test).
† P < 0.10 (one-tailed test).

0.53 (0.86)
−4.26∗∗ (−3.06)
−0.97† (−1.51)
−3.58∗ (−2.10)

0.55 (1.09)
−3.65∗∗ (−2.91)

0.38∗ (1.76)
0.06 (0.33)
0.08 (0.99)
0.04 (0.21)
−0.40∗∗∗ (−3.09)
−0.93† (−1.49)
−0.12 (−0.56)
−0.19 (−0.11)
0.05 (0.69)
−0.04 (−0.21)
0.40∗∗∗ (3.09)
0.09† (1.49)

USA (location control)
Constant

Lead vs. outpost
Source vs.
off-shore

0.46∗ (2.18)
0.35∗∗ (2.36)
−0.03 (−0.32)

The finding that there are differences in autonomy over planning decisions for plants located for
the same reason but with different levels of technol-

0.38∗ (1.76)
0.059 (0.33)
0.01 (0.99)

5.2. Autonomy over planning decisions

Table 3
Estimation of logit model (z scores in parentheses)

For plants that are part of a network, are there some
decisions which headquarters wants to control regardless of the type of plant? Plants in this sample have the
least autonomy (smallest numbers) over Control decisions such as human resource policies for management
and choice of accounting system. This is not surprising given that standardization across plants in a network on these management systems could be important. Planning decisions such as production scheduling and maintenance policies and practices show very
little indication of centralized decision making. The
higher means for planning decisions indicate that these
decisions are examples of systems that are inherently
highly plant specific.
Taking an average across decision types for each
plant type provides an indication of the overall autonomy of a plant. Contributor and Source plants have
the most autonomy while Outpost plants have the least
autonomy. Plants with a high extent of technical activities at the site (Source, Lead, Contributor) have more
autonomy than those that do not (Off-Shore, Outpost,
Server).

Contributor
vs. server

5.1. Descriptive characteristics of autonomy
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Planning decisions
Production decisions
Control decisions

Lead vs. source

Lead vs.
contributor

Server vs.
off-shore

Contributor
vs. source

is categorical, representing a plant’s role. The explanatory variables are the management system factors that indicate the plant’s autonomy over planning,
production and control decisions. A logit approach allows us to consider the decision factors as a system.
Because a large proportion of plants are located in
one country, the US, a 0-1 indicator variable was included to control for any resulting location effect. Stata
7.0 econometric software was used to estimate the
model.
Table 2 reports mean levels of autonomy for different plant types and different decisions. Table 3 reports
results of the logit model estimation. Results are reported as pairwise contrasts between plant types. A
significant coefficient for a factor indicates that the
factor significantly discriminates one plant type from
the other.

−0.12 (−0.56)
−0.02 (−0.11)
0.05 (0.69)

C.A. Maritan et al. / Journal of Operations Management 22 (2004) 489–503
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ogy at the site is fairly robust with respect to sign
and significance. The significant technology-driven
contrasts suggest greater autonomy over planning
decisions for Source versus Off-Shore plants (H1a,
P < 0.05), for Lead versus Outpost plants (H1c, P
< 0.05) but not for Contributor versus Server plants
(H1b).
Because of its higher level of technological competence, we also expected that Lead plants would differ
from Source and Contributor plants in their greater
control over planning decisions. However, we find no
support for H2a and H2b.
5.3. Autonomy over production decisions
There is no support for H3a and H3b that there
is greater autonomy over production decisions in
Server versus Off-Shore, Contributor versus Source
plants. There is also no support for H3c and H3d
that Lead plants would have greater autonomy over
production decisions than Contributor and Source
plants, respectively. Interestingly, there is a significant coefficient with the opposite sign indicating that
Lead plants have less autonomy rather than more
relative to Contributor plants concerning production
decisions.
Equipment sourcing and component sourcing decisions may be shared with R&D facilities for unique
products made by Lead plants. This would tend to
reduce their autonomy over these decisions. Further,
some standard equipment sourcing and component
sourcing may be delegated directly to Contributor and
Source plants. This finding raises the possibility that
the role of the Lead plant is quite different than the
highly autonomous one that we hypothesized and we
think Ferdows suggests.
5.4. Autonomy over control decisions
In support of H4b, there is more autonomy for
control decisions for Contributor versus Server
plants (P < 0.10). However, there is no support
for H4a that Source plants would have more autonomy on control decisions than Off-Shore plants
or H4c that Lead plants would have more autonomy on control decisions than Outpost plants on
control decisions. The little support for control de-

cisions varying by degree of technical activities at
the site could be because due to a desire for standardization, these decisions are retained and determined at headquarters or at the business unit
level.
5.5. Robustness tests
To check the robustness of the results, we conducted several additional analyses. The classification
of plants was based on a question that asked respondents the reasons for locating the plant. The original
reason for locating an older plant may no longer hold
and may not reflect the current role. Ferdows (1989,
1997) argues that plant roles may change over time.
Respondents also answered a second question that
asked about location criteria that would apply if the
plant was to be located now. These “now” data reflect
hypothetical choices and not actual ones but may capture additional information about current plant roles.
We reclassified the 184 plants for which we had the
“now” location data and found that 50 plants changed
categories.
The logit model was re-estimated using the new
classification of plants. The results for H1, H2 and H4,
the Planning and Control hypotheses are unchanged.
However, the results for some of the production hypotheses differ. While the H3b and H3c remain unsupported, the results for H3a and H3d change. In
the original model, the Lead versus Contributor contrast was significant but negative, contrary to H3d.
With the reclassification of plants, this significant but
contrary result disappears. In the original model, the
Server versus Off-Shore contrast was not significant
as predicted by H3a. However, with the reclassification of plants, this contrast is significant (P < 0.10)
but negative, indicating that Server plants have less autonomy over production decisions than do Off-Shore
plants, contrary to the hypothesized direction. This
contrary result may reflect the fact that Off-Shore
plants are located for access to production inputs. The
items comprising the Production decision factor are
all related to sourcing; therefore, a plant located for
access to inputs may control more of its sourcing
decisions.
A second robustness check considered that Ferdows
(1997) allows that a plant may have more than one
role. Given the approach we take in our analysis, we
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could not accommodate a plant having multiple roles.
When we classified the plants we restricted each to one
role. However, when we assigned roles to plants, there
were some plants that despite fitting best in one category based on our classification criteria could reasonably be placed into another category. We re-examined
these “borderline” cases to investigate if our results
are sensitive to the role that we assigned. There were
20 of our 196 plants that could arguably be reclassified
based on the strategic reasons for the site and therefore conceivably have a second role. We assigned these
plants to their alternative roles and re-estimated the
logit model. The results for H1, H2 and H4, the Planning and Control hypotheses are unchanged. However, the results for some of the production hypotheses change with the reclassification. As we found with
the reclassification based on the “now” location data
discussed above, H3b remains unsupported, and the
significant contrary result for H3d disappears. Also,
as we found in the previous robustness test, the Server
versus Off-Shore contrast is negative and significant
(P < 0.05) contrary to H3a. In addition, the Lead versus Source contrast is significant but negative (P <
0.10) contrary to H3c. Source plants, like Off-Shore
plants, are located for access to inputs. Thus the argument made above, that plants located to access inputs,
may have more autonomy for production decisions –
since they relate to sourcing – would also apply to this
result.
Finally, we tested for industry effects. The multiindustry sample includes plants in 41 different 3-digit
SIC codes. Two industries, pharmaceuticals and automotive are particularly well represented with 32 and
36 of the 196 plants, respectively, so we estimated a
logit model with 0-1 control variables for the two industries. The inclusion of these industry controls did
not change the results of the hypothesis tests.
6. Discussion
6.1. Key results
In this study, we applied the Ferdows (1989, 1997)
framework that defines plant types and found it to be
a useful device for organizing information about differences in autonomy over planning, production and
control decisions among plants with different roles in
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multinational firms. The notion of differentiated fit is
useful to help understand the operations and management of plants that are part of a network. Although
this concept is typically applied to relationships between corporate headquarters and international subsidiaries in multinational firms and between corporate
headquarters and business units in diversified firms,
it is also applicable to the business unit-plant relationship. Different management systems fit different
strategic plant roles.
We focused on one aspect of management systems,
the autonomy the plant has over three types of decisions, planning, production and control, and tested
whether this autonomy systematically differs among
plants with different roles. Overall, the results are not
strong. Our findings are strongest for the planning decision hypotheses. The control decision hypotheses are
only weakly supported, a result that is consistent with
the interpretation that the business unit and/or headquarters retains authority or centralizes these decisions
for most plants. There is no support for the production
decision hypotheses. However, an important result is
that there are some contrary findings that raise interesting questions.
Although none of the production decision hypotheses were supported, we found that Lead plants had
significantly less autonomy over production decisions
than Contributor plants contrary to expectations. However, this finding is not as stable as the planning and
control findings. In the robustness analysis conducted
to investigate secondary roles of plants, this significant
contrary result not only was no longer present but another significant contrary result emerged; Lead plants
had significantly less autonomy over production decisions than Source plants. In both cases, Lead plants
did not have the high level of autonomy that Ferdows
suggests.
The insignificant and even contrary findings involving Lead plants suggest that the relationship between
the role of a Lead plant and autonomy over managerial
decisions may be more complex than the framework
implies. We expected more autonomy over planning
in Lead plants than in others, but it did not differ between Lead and other types of plants in the ways we
expected. We attributed too much control over these
decisions to Lead plants. The need for a Lead plant to
coordinate activities across the network may mean it
has less freedom in making independent decisions for
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its own operations. While this revised view contradicts
the idea of the Lead plant as a plant with “absolute”
control over important decisions, it acknowledges that
there may be a positive interdependence with business unit headquarters or other plants. The significant contrary results in some of our tests indicating
that Lead plants have less autonomy over production decisions than other plant types is also consistent
with this explanation. Further research to investigate
the constraints on a Lead plant’s autonomy would be
helpful.
6.2. Limitations
The study is based on a relatively small sample,
particularly since we classify the plants into six types.
Creating factors for categories of management decisions gave us sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate
the logit model. The factors also simplified interpretation; however, grouping specific decisions into these
categories might also have masked some differences
within each category of decision type. Since we had
a lack of significant results for many of our hypotheses it would be worthwhile, using a larger sample,
to examine the individual decisions as discriminators to investigate whether particular constituent
items were driving the result (or lack of result) for a
factor.
Another limitation is that the sample we used
is not random. Survey respondents were managers
from firms with a demonstrated interest in multinational manufacturing issues. These firms may
represent more leading edge management practices
than firms in general. The results therefore should
be interpreted as indications of practices of a sample of managerially sophisticated firms. Nonetheless,
the analysis offers useful insights for plants in general.
A final limitation is that we have only investigated
differentiation in management systems as defined by
degree of autonomy over managerial decisions. There
may be substantive differences in how plants with different roles are managed that would not be captured
by their relative degrees of autonomy. However, finding some differences in autonomy that are consistent
with our expectations is sufficient to argue that there
is differentiated fit between management systems and
plant roles.

6.3. Implications
Given that there is differentiated fit, if certain types
of plants are combined in the same network differing
levels of autonomy will be needed for some types of
managerial decisions. For example, based on our results, one could combine Source and Off-Shore plants
in the same network only if it is not too costly to differentiate planning decisions. Control decisions would
have to be differentiated if Contributor and Server
plants are combined. Other types of plants are more
easily combined. For example, there are few systems
which must be differentiated when combining Contributor and Source or Server and Off-Shore plants. If
it is too costly to combine plants of different types,
firms may choose to have predominantly one type of
plant in its network and corresponding management
systems matching that predominant type.
This issue of which types of plants to combine in
plant networks raises the possibility that differentiated
fit among plants within a business unit may also have
implications for the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). While a strength of the
Ferdows’ framework is its detailed discussion of plant
types and roles, a corresponding problem may be the
absence of discussion of how these networks of plants
might fit with particular firm organizations or business unit strategies. This absence may have led us to
interpret Ferdows’ framework as expecting higher autonomy on all dimensions for Lead plants. Certainly,
the scope of the tasks assigned to Lead plants is the
highest (Ferdows, 1989). But sometimes greater responsibility may correspond with less autonomy. For
example, responsibility may require detailed cooperation with other plants, or other organizational entities, such as R&D facilities of the business-unit headquarters, that are not explicitly part of the Ferdows’
framework. Other frameworks, such as the idea of
the Transnational firm of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989)
which explicitly talk about different types of multinational firm strategies may be usefully combined with
plant networks described by Ferdows.
In this study we attempted to empirically validate
some of the implications of Ferdows’ framework for
managing multinational plant networks and investigated whether different plants in the same company
require different management systems. We focused on
the autonomy that plants have over different types of
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management decisions and found evidence that management systems with respect to autonomy over key
decisions are indeed different for plants with different strategic roles. Ferdows argues that understanding
the strategic roles of plants in multinational networks
helps companies exploit the plants’ activities for the
benefit of the network. The results of this study highlight the importance of understanding not only what
strategic role each plant in a network plays but also
how management systems might need to be differentiated so that the plants can pursue their roles effectively.
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Appendix A. Profile of sample plants
(A) Companies represented
3M Company
Amoco Corporation
The BOC Group PLC
Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH
Borg Warner Inc.
Brunswick Corporation
CPC International
Eastman Kodak Company
Deere & Company
FMC Corporation
Ford Motor Company
Gates Rubber Company
General Motors Corporation
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
Hanson PLC
Honda Motor Co.
Honeywell, Inc.
Imperial Chemical Industries
Inverness Castings Group Inc.
Kaiser Aluminum Corporation
Kalamazoo Holdings Inc.
KAO Corporation
Lincoln Electric Holdings Inc.
Masco Corporation

Matsushita Electric Industrial Company
Merck & Co., Inc.
NEC Corporation
Neenah Foundry Company
Otsuka Corporation
Philips Gloeilampenfabricken
Pfizer, Inc.
Procter & Gamble Company
Samsung Corporation
Sandoz Ltd.
Seiko Corporation
Settsu Metal Industrial Co., Ltd.
SGS Thomson
Shiseido Company, Ltd.
Sinochem (China National Chemicals Import & Export Corp.)
SKF Group
SmithKline Beecham PLC
TD Williamson, Inc.
United Technologies Corporation
Unocal Corporation
The Upjohn Company
Victaulic Company of America
Witco Corporation
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(B) Plant locations
Country

No. of plants

Country

No. of plants

Country

No. of plants

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Egypt
France
Germany
Hong Kong

3
1
1
3
6
1
1
3
9
1

India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Nigeria
Philippines

3
4
2
2
15
2
3
3
1
2

Singapore
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela

3
3
4
3
2
2
1
16
95
1

(C) Plant SIC codes
3-Digit SIC for primary product

No. of
plants

204 Food – grains
207 Food – fats and oils

1
1

209
208
267
276

1
1
4
1

Food – miscellaneous preparations
Food – beverages
Paper – products
Paper – business forms

281 Chemicals – industrial inorganic
283 Chemicals – pharmaceuticals
284 Chemicals – soaps and cosmetics
286
287
289
291
301
305
321
332
336
344

Chemicals – industrial organic
Chemicals – agricultural
Chemicals – other
Petroleum – refining
Rubber – tires
Rubber – gaskets

Stone, glass, concrete – flat glass
Primary metals – iron and steel
Primary metals – non-ferrous
Fabricated metal products –
structural
348 Fabricated metal products –
ordnance and accessories

11
32
19
5
1
4
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1

3-Digit SIC for primary product

No. of
plants

352 Industrial equipment – farm
2
354 Industrial equipment – metalworking
1
machinery
355 Industrial equipment – specialty
2
356 Industrial equipment – general
19
357 Industrial equipment – computers
4
358 Industrial equipment – refrigeration and
2
service industry
359 Industrial equipment – miscellaneous
4
361 Electronic and electrical – transmission
2
362 Electronic and electrical – electrical and
2
industrial apparatus
365 Electronic and electrical – audio and visual 1
367 Electronic and electrical – electronics
5
371 Transporatation equipment – motor vehicle 36
372 Transporatation equipment – aircraft
1
375 Transporatation equipment – motorcycles
6
382 Measurement instruments – laboratory
4
equipment
384 Measurement instruments – medical
5
386 Measurement instruments – photographic
1
387 Measurement instruments – watches
3
393 Miscellaneous manufacturing – musical
1
instruments
394 Miscellaneous manufacturing – games
2
399 Miscellaneous manufacturing – brushes

1
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